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Mali's 2018 elections: a turning point?

By Jonathan Sears

Summary

- With Mali's presidential elections scheduled for 29 July, and ('proximity') elections rescheduled for 25 October, 2018 will be a highly significant moment in Malian political history.
- Even if modestly credible elections on much of Mali's territory demonstrate a degree of power projection and administrative control, they also risk reinforcing the conditions under which Malian pluralism eroded from 2002–2012, and preserve uneven recognition of government authority.
- Facing such concerns, emboldened opposition actors are, with growing energy, criticizing status quo politics and administration with increasing strength and coherence.
- In response, and with increasingly pervasive discourses of change and renewal, the Malian political class is being critiqued from within and without.
- Clearly, the 2018 electoral context is difficult: governance, security, and political economy challenges have eroded public confidence, and continue to undermine the sustainable restoration of the state's authority.

This brief considers the broader political context of the upcoming presidential, regional and local ('proximity') elections in Mali. First, the coalition to support Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta's (IBK) candidacy for a second term is in contrast with the opposition loosely organizing around 'anyone but IBK'. Before considering the significance of opposition campaigning for more than 'alternance,' we take stock of the disconnections between diverse daily preoccupation of Malians across the country and elite political dynamics –particularly as Accord implementation inter-relates with the upcoming elections. To take seriously the profound significance that the 2018 elections hold for Malian political history, we see how calls for more than alternance point to aspirations for wholesale transformation of Malian politics, governance, and even the structure of the state itself. We conclude that elections in 2018 bear great burdens at the fulcrum of retrenching or challenging status quo governance, of foreclosing significant change and inviting more generalized social disruption, or enabling the re-invention of the authority of the Malian state.

With Mali's presidential elections scheduled for 29 July, and proximity elections rescheduled for 25 October, 2018 will be a highly significant moment in Malian political history. The 2013–2018 mandate of President IBK is being evaluated. For the coalition to support IBK's candidacy for a second term¹,



« If the anti-status quo tendencies, sentiments, and movements currently active are not reflected adequately in the poll results in 2018, then current mobilizations suggest real possibilities of more generalized social disruption, on top of an already high level of instability in many parts of the country ».

the continuity with IBK is crucial to keeping the peace process on track, and thus to preserve social stability where it still has roots. Absent a renewed IBK mandate, Mali's increasingly difficult situation could become still more precarious. Of IBK and his enthusiasts, critical assessments abound. Opposition political actors, civil society activists, journalists, and the UN Secretary General criticize IBK's underperformance particularly in implementing the 2015 peace Accord.² IBK has not credibly forged a path out of the crisis of 2012–2013, which rest on inherited dynamics from two terms (2002–2007, 2007–2012) of former President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT). Political party coalitions and consensus governance have entrenched governments' unresponsiveness to popular discontent, and preserved institutional deficits and representatives' poor performance.³ An internally divided government has not sustained a coherent strategic vision, and has had five Prime Ministers in less than five years. Partial achievements, omissions, failures, and false starts stem fundamentally from a lack of effective leadership and meaningful ownership, especially of Accord-related reforms. Intimations of deepening crisis in 2018 suggest the urgent need for transformations beyond the activities undertaken in the 2013–2018 period.⁴

Thus, even if modestly credible elections on much of Mali's territory demonstrate a degree of power projection and administrative control, they also risk reinforcing the conditions

under which Malian pluralism eroded from 2002–2012, and preserve uneven recognition of government authority. Moreover, if the anti-status quo tendencies, sentiments, and movements currently active are not reflected adequately in the poll results in 2018, then current mobilizations suggest real possibilities of more generalized social disruption, on top of an already high level of instability in many parts of the country. In this context, then even those deeply disappointed with IBK since 2013, face 1) the persuasive influence of investments made and promised in the election campaign period, including improved conditions for armed forces personnel; 2) supporters highlighting IBK's concrete, if modest achievements in five years; and, 3) the concern that opposition candidates are themselves not well-placed to govern significantly differently.

Opposition forces energized for 'anyone but IBK.'⁵

Facing such concerns, emboldened opposition actors are, with growing energy, criticizing status quo politics and administration with increasing strength and coherence. Incumbents may feel these critiques as mounting pressure. There are signals of an increasingly tough state posture towards opposition forces.⁶ Suppression of rallies will have unpredictable results, though opposition seems more likely to be galvanized than dissipated. The 2017 'Don't touch my

constitution' mobilization against the constitutional referendum is instructive, when seen as an antecedent to electoral campaign-period dynamics. The polarization into 'yes' and 'no' campaigns illustrates contradictions within and among different segments of Mali's political actors and cultures, both elite and popular. Moreover, IBK's reform-seekers inadequately built public awareness and support about the place of constitutional change in the peace process.⁷

These critiques and failures reinforce doubts, and further highlight the lack of relevance and utility that many across the country feel towards their government's disconnection from many of Malians' daily preoccupations. Incumbents seek to leverage their advantages within the current administration, while the Accord-mandated interim authorities prepare their proximity electoral strategies towards October 2018.⁸ However the related promises, negotiations, and compromises play out into summer and fall 2018, these dynamics perpetuate the perception that electoral politics do not necessarily function to place popularly legitimate actors in office, but rather reinforce behind-the-scenes negotiations for positions and influence amongst national and regional elites. All of these elements entangle crucial questions of participation (who is mobilized and by whom) and representation (who speaks for whom to whom) are also at stake in elections (presidential and especially proximity). Beyond preserving or seeking access to state-mediated resources, and patron-clientelist relations, do these candidates credibly seek a broader public interest? A decline in IBK's historically strong support from key actors in Mali's religious establishment is also instructive. Moreover, current dynamics exist alongside the histories of outright electoral fraud, intimidation, and circumvention of official procedures. Outside of those elites jockeying for support and influence, among certain populations, the authority of the State is worse than irrelevant: it is suspect, whether dysfunctional, neglectful, discriminatory, or predatory⁹.

In this context, the 2018 elections will simultaneously 1) re-legitimize and reinforce state institutions and roles, as well as norms and practices of non-state socio-cultural ordering, and 2) set forth the profound interrogation of the articulation of these institutions, norms, and practices to legitimate Malian state authority.¹⁰ Similarly paradoxical, greater public transparency does not necessarily or immediately produce more accountability. When amplified through civil society associations (CSOs) and media activism, the

Auditor General reports on fraud and mismanagement, both expose and further concretize the bases of public distrust in state institutions, because of slow, uneven, or absent prosecution¹¹. Compounding the weakness of consistently workable trust among groups and actors key to organizing credible elections are significant logistical obstacles, an ambitious timeline of tasks under uneven security conditions, as well as coordination –and contention– among multiple administration structures, opposition actors, and donor-partner entities.¹² More than five years of crisis conditions have complicated and compounded these issues. The 2018 elections will manifest not only Malians' profound doubts, but also their strong desire for lasting, substantive change.

More than alternance

"These critiques and failures reinforce doubts, and further highlight the lack of relevance and utility that many across the country feel towards their government's disconnection from many of Malians' daily preoccupations".

In response, and with increasingly pervasive discourses of change and renewal, the Malian political class is being critiqued from within and without. High-profile activists such as Youssouf 'Ras Bath' Bathily vocally question the degree to which there are,

within the Malian political landscape, candidates who represent genuinely credible alternatives. Especially among a communications-savvy generation of activists emerging since 2012–2013, civil society actors and the engaged media are voicing, with increasing volume, their entitlement to more representative, responsive, and accountable governance.¹³ The serious problem of public distrust in state institutions is also acknowledged by calls for 'a new governance,' from some Presidential candidates : "[N]ot an alternance that consists in replacing President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita," but rather, "a profound change: a renewal and rejuvenation of the political class, strong measures against corruption, particularly of elites, significant decentralization."¹⁴

Clearly, the 2018 electoral context is difficult: governance, security, and political economy challenges have eroded public confidence, and continue to undermine the sustainable restoration of the state's authority. Malian voters also face systemic causes of marginalization from the democratic process; low literacy and weak civic formation confront, fraud, corruption, or bias in the electoral institutions.¹⁵ Notwithstanding the slogan, "L'alternance in 2018 to save Mali," many opposition actors have close ties with status quo politics and the recent past of Mali's crises.¹⁶ Even where 'emerging leaders' may be distinguished from an 'old guard,' Mali's fragmented political landscape incentivizes strategic

alliances to leverage individuals' strong local support bases. Personalized more than programmatic, Mali's political pluralism is interwoven with the networks of particular candidates. Such features may preserve some stability, but can also reinforce perceptions that genuine political alternatives are highly limited. Thus, sincere change-makers with strong links in the Malian administration struggle to embody the idea that they are different enough to be able to do differently on what matters most to Malians: governance, peace process, and socio-economic development.¹⁷

Conclusion: towards political and institutional transformation?

On top of issues of who governs are the fundamental questions of the character of the Malian State, regardless of the various administrative and political actors in the roles. IBK's administration has done little to restore the confidence of Malian's most marginalized populations. Thus, entwined with the government's mixed reputation are issues of the State's capacity, legitimacy, and relevance. Malians' hopes, articulated through the electoral processes, struggle to find fertile ground in the difficult, really existing conditions of weak governance, dependent economics, uneven development, and multifaceted insecurity. In the decade before the crises of 2012–2013, multiple food crises significantly undermined the livelihoods of the poorest families, and exposed the most vulnerable – especially women and children, in rural areas – to greater risks, privations, and burdens.

The expectations being raised during 2018 electioneering are very high. A “shortcut to modernization”¹⁸, of “economic, political, social and administrative life”¹⁹ remains central to the idea of Mali as a nation-state, which has been fostered by the Malian bureaucratic bourgeoisie and since independence, and elaborated by the political class, in partnership with donors. As conduits for donor funding flows, incumbents and opposition candidates alike can find willing (if circumspect) audiences for ambitious programs, and patrons can find eager clients with their own needs and responsibilities. Indeed, part of what helps clients–patrons relationships through gifts is that clients also have material needs (personal) and obligations (familial and social).

Clearly, governing Mali's political economy of crisis, stabilization, and reconciliation needs well-grounded expectations, based on adequate assessment of difficult and varied conditions of climate, demography, and resources across the Malian territory. To this end, Mali urgently needs widely legitimate governance institutions representative of and responsive to the populations' needs and aspirations in their national,

regional, and local contexts. As noted by Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga: “if there is no election, no one will have a legal basis for governing.”²⁰ Moreover, PM Maïga's visit to the centre and north of Mali on 22–26 March 2018 sought to demonstrate the Malian government's commitment to organize free and transparent elections throughout the country in the face of security challenges. Intimations of deepening crisis in 2018 take the very concerning security situation as their starting point. Malians in different regions experience these insecurities differently²¹, however, and this diversity plays a crucial role in how they hear the promises of government representatives and candidates. Elections may afford the legal basis for governing (in domestic terms of Mali's constitution, and in international terms of donor relations); however, they do not automatically solidify legitimacy throughout the country. Malians' experience of these difficult conditions colours their enthusiasm for electoral democracy, and when criticizing the behavior of Malian elites as corrupt and non-responsive, public opinion surveys “suggest lingering nostalgia for authoritarianism.”²²

Thus, despite Malians' lived understanding, that procedural and legal minimums of democratic process are fundamentally important as a barrier against the excesses of outright dictatorship, Malians' resistance to authoritarian governments does not entirely dispel a tolerance, even desire for a strong state actors, with practices closer to (benevolent, if stern) paternal power over patronage resources than to the broader demands of public service.²³ The Malian state remains the site of contested processes of negotiating different views and aims for state authority. Among the legacies of Mali's 25 years of incomplete and uneven decentralization are divergences among key political actors on the desirable and possible level of central and decentralized powers and responsibilities. This persistent core of disagreement troubles elections as mechanisms for the legitimation of state authority and future reconciliation. The 2018 presidential and proximity elections are now mutually constitutive of the current and next phases of peace Accord implementation.

As former decentralization Minister Ousmane Sy notes, “elections do not lead a country out of crisis [...] the conquest of power is useful only if there is a country.”²⁴ Beyond electoral competition is the felt necessity to deconstruct and correct the seriously flawed political and institutional models of Malian democracy. Wherever the State is rejected demands “winning back the hearts of communities, which can only be done by a State different from the present one *in its conception, in its practices, and even in its existence*.”²⁵ This is a wholesale refounding of state–society relations on electoral and democratic bases, with institutional mechanisms

answering to the multiple sites of socio-cultural ordering and moral authority in localities around the country. Elections in 2018 will offer a minimum legal basis necessary for domestic governing and for continued international cooperation. Both, of course, are necessary for the massive tasks of rebuilding public trust and state–society relations fit to the demands of governing the dimensions of diversity in Mali²⁶. Worthy of careful observation and consideration also is the degree to which 2018 elections will help re-establish and reinforce the authority of community and national leaders, and will build trust in them, particularly among youth. Leaders' contextual and contested moral authority is a crucial part of Mali's complex political institutions, actors, and cultures.²⁷ Elections in 2018 bear great burdens. They must not foreclose possibilities for significant change, in a performance of mere electoral ritual, but rather embolden and enable Malians to innovate, renovate, and re-invent the presence of the State across the country.

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¹ Baba Ahmed, '[Présidentielle au Mali : autour d'IBK, une coalition en quête d'unité](#)', *Jeune Afrique*, 5 March 2018; '[Mali: Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta serait candidat à sa succession](#)', *RFI*, 11 March 2018.

² Observatoire pour les Élections et la Bonne Gouvernance au Mali, '[Élection présidentielle de 2018 au Mali](#)', 24 March 2018; UNSC, '[Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali](#)', S/2017/1105 26 December 2017; Friedrich Ebert Foundation, '[Que pensent les Maliens?](#)' *Mali-mètre no. 9*, 2017; Joseph Brunet-Jailly, '[La situation politique du Mali à quatre mois de l'élection présidentielle](#)', *Mediapart [blogue]*, 23 March 2018.

³ Jamie Bleck and Nicolas van de Walle, 'Parties and issues in Francophone West Africa: Towards a theory of non-mobilization' *Democratization* 18(5), 2011, pp. 1125–1145; Isaline Bergamachi, 'The Fall of a Donor Darling: The Role of Aid in Mali's Crisis', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 52(3), 2014, pp. 347–78.

⁴ Ousmane Sy, interviewed in Bokar Sangaré, '[Le Mali veut organiser une élection présidentielle alors que la situation](#)

[sécuritaire est pire qu'en 2013](#)', *Le Monde*, 26 February 2018.

⁵ Aliou Badara Diarra, '[Coup De Tonnerre A Koulouba : IBK perd les soutiens du Cherif de Niore et de Mahamoud Dicko](#)', *L'Enqueteur*, 16 January 2018. Joining the chorus of 'anyone but IBK,' Islamic High Council of Mali president Mahamoud Dicko, illustrates IBK's loss of support from a potentially significant religious base, for whom faith-informed political discourses, not only decry corruption and impunity, but also cast aspersions on the moral authority of the incumbent president, as well as those who might be most closely associated with him.

⁶ '[Bamako : Une manifestation contre la « partialité » de la France dans la crise malienne violemment empêchée par les forces de l'ordre](#).' *Le Républicain*, 11 January 2018; Baba Ahmed, '[Mali : montée de la grogne dans l'armée à la veille de la présidentielle](#)', *Jeune Afrique*, 8 February 2018.

⁷ Baba Dakono, '[Les leçons de l'échec de la révision constitutionnelle au Mali](#).' *ISS Today*, 30 August 2017; Baba Dakono and Khadija Maïga, '[2018 Mali's problems are much bigger than July's presidential election](#)', *ISS Today*, 26 March 2018.

⁸ Moussa Mara, '[Le nouveau code des collectivités territoriales qui nous éloigne de l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale](#)!', *Moussamara.com*, 26 October 2017. Former Prime Minister and 2018 Presidential candidate Mara's reading of the law and Accord is undoubtedly informed by his position, but nevertheless helpfully signals the range of issues, regardless of his assessment of the implications.

⁹ Adam Sandor, '[Insecurity, the Breakdown of Social Trust, and Armed Actor Governance in Central and Northern Mali](#)', *Centre FrancoPaix Mali Project report*; Ibrahim Maïga, 'Au Mali, la myriade de groupes armés constitue un obstacle à la paix', *ISS Today*, 6 February 2018

¹⁰ Recognizing and formalizing certain customary or religious authorities, as envisioned in the Accord, sits at the crux of many complex and contested issues of representativeness, identity, and social stratification within and between communities. [Accord Pour La Paix Et La Réconciliation Au Mali Issu Du Processus D'alger, Partie V : Réconciliation, Justice et Questions Humanitaires, Chapitre 14 Réconciliation et Justice](#).

¹¹ Le Vérificateur Général, [Rapport annuel 2015](#); Jonathan Sears, '[Unmet Hopes to Govern Mali's persistent Crisis](#)', *Centre FrancoPaix A Stabilizing Mali Project Report*, August 2017; C.f. Nicolas Beau '[Mali, des détournements gigantesques sur](#)

[le matériel militaire](#)’, *Mondafrique*, 19 February 2018.

¹² ‘Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga: il y aura de nouvelles cartes d’électeurs’, *BBC Afrique*, 20 March 2018; ‘Chronogramme de l’élection présidentielle’, *Le Prétoire*, 15 March 2018. The European Union demanded reforms after the 2013 Presidential elections, that the problematic ‘opacity’ of the Constitutional Court’s role in tabulating votes be eliminated. ‘Élection présidentielle au Mali : l’Union européenne pose ses conditions’, *Jeune Afrique*, 20 February 2018. C.f. Union Européenne, ‘Mission d’observation Électorale De l’Union Européenne Rapport final – Élection Présidentielle 2013’, 2013; Benjamin Roger, ‘Mali : Course contre la montre.’, *MaliTribune*, 28 February 2018.

¹³ Bruce Whitehouse, ‘Political Participation and Mobilization after Mali’s 2012 Coup.’, *African Studies Review* 60(1), 2017, pp. 5-35.

¹⁴ TV5MONDE – Afrique, ‘La situation sécuritaire reste pré-occupante au Mali mais il faut des élections’, Moussa Mara (interview), *Le journal Afrique*, 1 March 2018.

¹⁵ Traoré, M. et Diaby S.K.M., ‘Les élections au Mali. Pourquoi les taux de participation est toujours aussi bas’, *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, 2011.

¹⁶ Baba Ahmed, ‘Mali : comment l’opposition se met en ordre de marche pour la présidentielle de 2018’, *Jeune Afrique*, 16 February 2018. ‘Mali : Tiébilé, Oumar, Soumaïla et les autres... les opposants en route vers la présidentielle’, *Jeune Afrique*, 18 October 2017.

¹⁷ At another level, Mali’s lack of credible, potentially transformative political alternatives is linked to Mali’s highly conditioned policy autonomy. Political actors’ proposals for security, governance, and development exist within conditions of possibility framed by international intervention and cooperation (Bergamaschi 2014, *infra*). C.f. William Brown, ‘Sovereignty matters: Africa, donors, and the aid relationship’, *African Affairs*, 2013; Bruno Charbonneau, ‘The Dilemmas of International Intervention in Mali’, *Centre FrancoPaix A Stabilizing Mali Project Report*, October 2017.

¹⁸ Catriona Craven-Matthews and Pierre Englebert, ‘A Potemkin state in the Sahel? The empirical and the fictional in Malian state reconstruction’, *African Security*, 2017.

¹⁹ Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, and Matt Andrews, ‘Looking Like a State: Techniques of Persistent Failure in State Capability for Implementation’, *Journal of Development Studies* 49, no. 1, 2012, pp. 7-9.

²⁰ ‘Présidentielle au Mali : le Premier ministre promet des moyens pour sécuriser le centre du pays’, *Jeune Afrique / AFP*, 12 February 2018.

²¹ While 32% of Malians affirm being affected by the crisis, there are significant variances among regions, ranging from 100% for Kidal to 5% in Koulikoro. Mamadou Dolo, ‘Afrobarometer : Resultat du 7ème round d’Afrobarometre au Mali’, *Infosept*, 23 February 2018. Similarly, food insecurity may be an issue common to northern and southern regions but may also have significant divergent features.

²² Boniface Dulani, ‘Malian Democracy Recovering; Military Rule Still Admired. Afrobarometer Policy Paper 12’, 2014, p. 18. Popular satisfaction with democracy, which had fallen over the course of ATT’s regime from 63% in 2002 to 31% in 2012, had rebounded only to 53% during the early moments of greatest enthusiasm for IBK’s presidency.

²³ Localized or ‘micro’ authoritarianisms, under a variety of ‘chiefs,’ find corresponding practices in government and non-governmental bureaucracies. Daouda Coulibaly, ‘Comprendre la variation de la mise en oeuvre de la participation publique entre les administrations locales : Le cas des Communes III et V du district de Bamako au Mali’ *Thèse de Doctorat en études urbaines, L’Institut national de la recherche scientifique et l’Université du Québec à Montréal*, 2016. C.f. Sears 2017, *infra*.

²⁴ Sy in Sangaré 2018.

²⁵ Sy in Sangaré 2018; emphasis added.

²⁶ United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Sahel H. G. Sellassie: “One of the key lessons we learnt from the crisis in Mali is that democratization processes [...] need to be complemented by efforts to strengthen State institutions and better integrate and manage diverse societies.” ([Tackling Sahel’s enduring challenges requires regional, global cooperation](#)), 19 June 2014.

²⁷ Aurélien Tobie, ‘Central Mali: Violence, Local Perspectives And Diverging Narratives’ *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security No. 2017/5*, December 2017; Aurélie Campana, ‘Entre déstabilisation et enracinement local, les groupes djihadistes dans le conflit malien depuis 2015’, *Rapport Project Mali, Centre FrancoPaix* March 2018; Adib Bencherif, ‘De la “question touarègue” aux mémoires du conflit: pour une réconciliation malienne’, *Rapport Project Mali Centre FrancoPaix*, February 2018.



News and announcements

- Centre FrancoPaix and WAPSN Symposium 2018, Bamako, Mali, 4-5th of May 2018.

The Centre FrancoPaix, in partnership with the West Africa Peace and Security Network (WAPSN), is organising its fourth annual symposium in Bamako, Mali on 4-5 May 2018 at the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix (The Peacekeeping School). This event aims to create the space, time and opportunity for the free exchanges of ideas, scientific cooperation and practical interaction between policy and academic worlds. Each year highly topical issues are chosen to foster this exchange of ideas and provide a series of policy-relevant insights on peace and security in West Africa.

Participants include academics and experts, mostly from West Africa, the UK, continental Europe and Canada. Participants also include practitioners from a variety of organisations such as: civil society organisations (e.g. the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), diplomatic services, armed forces and regional and international organisations (e.g. ECOWAS, the UN, the EU), and research and training institutes (e.g. the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) and the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS), University of Ibadan, Nigeria. The provisional symposium programme can be [viewed here](#).

- At the 59th annual convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), held in San Francisco from April 4 to 7, Bruno Charbonneau presented "Intervention in Mali: Building Peace Between Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism" and was also chair of the panel "Peacekeeping: Between "Success" and "Exit Strategy"".

Maxime Ricard presented a paper co-written with Adib Bencherif entitled "Ethnography of (in)security brokers in West Africa" as part of the panel "Local and Global in Politics of Intervention".

- The West Africa Peace and Security Network's annual workshop "New Thinking on West African Security Challenges" will be held at the University of Portsmouth on the 17th-18th of May 2018. The provisional workshop programme can be [viewed here](#).

- Bruno Charbonneau published the article "The security strategy of France in the Sahel", in *Les grands dossiers de Diplomatie* 44 - Géopolitique de la France, April 2018.

He also participated on April 25, 2018 in the panel discussion entitled "[La contribution canadienne à la mission de paix au Mali \(MINUSMA\): prenons-nous des risques indus ou agissons-nous en tant que joueur mondial responsable?](#)", organized by the Africa Study Group, in Ottawa. Finally, he attended by videoconference, the roundtable "Les défis de la prévention de l'extrémisme violent au sein de l'espace francophone : réflexion vers des partenariats innovants en Afrique subsaharienne", which took place at the Quebec Office in Dakar on March 22. This activity took place within the framework of the Quinzaine de la Francophonie in Senegal and the upcoming launch in Quebec of the UNESCO Chair in the Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism.

- Emile Ouédraogo, Director of the "Centre africain de droit international pénal et de droit humanitaire" (CADIPH), is invited jointly by the ICRC and the French Red Cross to attend, alongside international experts, a Francophone roundtable on international humanitarian law to be held in Paris from 18 to 20 April 2018. He will also take part in the International Conference "Déclaration Saint-Boniface : 12 ans après" to be held in Ottawa (Canada) on May 9, 10 and 11, 2018.

- Emmanuel Goffi published 2 articles, "[La culture du silence dans les armées françaises : une servitude intellectuelle institutionnalisée](#)" in *Multipol - Réseau d'analyse et d'information sur l'actualité internationale*, 12 April 2018, and "[Les « robots tueurs » sont inévitables](#)" in *Le Devoir*, 14 April 2018. He also made several appearances on ICI Radio-Canada Première: "[Problèmes éthiques des systèmes d'armes létales autonomes](#)", in *L'heure de pointe-Toronto*, 12 April 2018; "[Encadrer les robots tueurs pour prévenir les dérives](#)", in *L'heure du monde*, 10 April 2018; "[La stratégie militaire des frappes en Syrie : Entrevue avec Emmanuel Goffi](#)", in *Faut pas croire tout ce qu'on dit*, 14 April 2018; and "[Emission spéciale sur les frappes en Syrie : la force militaire](#)", in *Le National*, 14 April 2018.

The Centre FrancoPaix in Conflict Resolution and Peace missions aims to promote scientific research, academic training and the development of conflict resolution research in the Francophonie.

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